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HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND THE FEDERAL RULES:
ARTICLE VIII-
I. MAPPING OUT THE BORDERS OF HEARSAY
The hearsay rule reflects a basic tenet of Anglo-American
evidence law: that the adversary system should make avail-
able to the trier of fact the most reliable evidence possible.'
Accordingly, traditional evidence law generally requires that,
whenever possible, testimonial evidence should be given by
witnesses under oath,2 present before the fact-finder, 3 and
subject to cross-examination. 4 The hearsay problem arises
whenever an adversary expects the trier of fact to treat ex-
1. The origin of the hearsay rule is closely related to the development of
the jury trial. The Anglo-Norman trial by recognition utilized "strangers"
chosen by a public official on the basis of their familiarity with the cir-
cumstances to settle a dispute between private litigants. The Anglo-Norman
jury thus relied almost entirely on extrajudicial evidence. Gradually the
adversaries obtained opportunity to present evidence in court, until by the
mid-1700's the jury relied exclusively on in-court evidence presented bythe
parties. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Con-
cept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 180-82 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan: Hear-
say Dangers]; Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U.
CHI. L. REV. 247, 247-48 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Morgan: Exclusionary
Rules].
Out of court assertions not subject to cross-examination are excluded not
because they are inherently unreliable. Rather, "the standard presentation
of narrative is of supposedly superior quality by witnesses on hand in person
to establish solely such matters as they have themselves observed." Maguire,
The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741,
743 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Maguire].
2. The oath requirement stems from the notion that the witness under
oath fears supernatural retribution if his testimony is deliberately false, and,
more commonly today, that he will be subject to prosecution for perjury if his
falsehood is discovered. Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 182-83. The present
efficacy of the oath as a significant safeguard is doubtful. E. MORGAN, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENE-Foreward 36 (1942); Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 186.
Oath alone is an insufficient safeguard, since even sworn hearsay is
excluded. Morgan, Hearsay, 25 MISS. L.J. 1, 3 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Morgan: Hearsay].
3. The witness's demeanor on the stand furnishes the trier of fact valu-
able clues for evaluating his credibility. E.g., Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
4. Cross-examination, which Wigmore described as "the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth," aids the adversary in expos-
ing both the witness's deliberate falsification and his unintentional errors in
perception, memory, and narration. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Morgan: Hearsay Dangers
at 185.
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trajudicial acts or utterances testimonially 5 when they were
done or made without these safeguards. To accept an out-of-
court statement as true, the trier of fact must conclude that
the person out of court and not under oath or subject to
cross-examination accurately perceived and remembered the
external event which prompted his act or utterance, and that
he attempted to make his action or statement reflect that
event as accurately as possible.6 For these reasons, under the
traditional hearsay rule, admissibility of any extrajudicial act
or utterance depends on whether it constitutes hearsay, and
if so, whether it is somehow exempt from the rule or fits
within an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay.
The Rule 801 Definition of Hearsay
Whether proffered evidence is hearsay is not as simple a
determination as it might appear, since a disagreement exists
as to the precise definition of hearsay.7 Rule 801(c) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." 8 To constitute hearsay under Rule 801(c),
the act or utterance in question must first be a "statement,"9
5. Testimonial use of extrajudicial assertions involves the trier's evalua-
tion of their probative value as though the declarant had himself made the
statement on the stand as direct evidence of the truth of the matter asserted.
Ladd, Some Highlights of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 191, 192 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Tribe, Triangulating Hear-
say, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tribe].
6. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1141 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Morgan: Hearsay & Non-Hearsay]; Morgan: Hearsay
Dangers at 198. E.g., Manuel v. American Employers Insurance Co., 212 So.
2d 527 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
7. Compare Morgan: Hearsay at 8, with 5 WIGMORE § 1362, Stewart,
Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 [hereinafter cited as
Stewart], and Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 214 (1961).
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (1975). In so defining hearsay, Rule 801 corre-
sponds closely to the definition of hearsay in Rule 63 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence (1953). "If an out-of-court statement, though offered for substantive
use, is not within the definition of hearsay, obviously, under the draft, the
'hearsay rule,' as such, would present no obstacle to admissibility, although
of course there may be other objections, constitutional or otherwise."
Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 591, 594 [hereinafter
cited as Falknor: Hearsay].
9. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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which the Rule defines as either "an oral or written asser-
tion," or "non-verbal conduct"'10 if intended as an assertion."
Thus, non-verbal conduct that is not intended as an assertion
by the actor is not hearsay under Rule 801. The Rule reflects
the view of Professors Falknor 2 and McCormick,' 3 and of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence 4 that so long as the actor has no
assertive intent, the danger of deliberate insincerity is
sufficiently lessened to justify leaving evidence of his act
outside the scope of the hearsay definition.15 In this regard,
Rule 801 is the same as what appears to be Louisiana law.16
10. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
11. The judge, in ruling on admissibility, must determine whether the
conduct was intended as an assertion. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FED. R. EVID.
801(a), Adv. Comm. Note. The party seeking to introduce evidence of non-
verbal conduct bears the burden of proof as to its non-assertive character.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a), Adv. Comm. Note. Louisiana courts have not always
recognized assertive conduct as hearsay. E.g., State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d
179 (La. 1973) (detective allowed to testify that victim picked out and handed
him defendant's photo).
12. Falknor, The "Hearsay" Rule as a "See-do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct,
33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Falknor: "Hearsay"
Rule as "See-do" Rule]. See also Maguire at 741.
13. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 250 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
14. UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 62(1) (1953). In 1974, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a new draft of the
Uniform Rules' of Evidence which is virtually identical to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING 145, 916 (1974).
15. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), Adv. Comm. Note; Falknor: "Hearsay" Rule as
"See-do" Rule at 133.
16. The writer found no Louisiana cases excluding evidence of non-
verbal non-assertive conduct on the basis that it is hearsay. State v.
Winstead, 204 La. 366, 15 So. 2d 793 (1943) (evidence of non-verbal non-
assertive conduct not hearsay where used to infer the actor's intent); Duni-
gan v. Hayes, 26 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) (defendant's conduct in
going to a repair shop admitted as evidence that he had promised to pay for
damages to the plaintiff's car, since no other reason would have prompted
defendant's visit to the shop; no hearsay objection was raised). In State v.
Roach, 256 La. 407, 427, 236 So. 2d 782, 788 (1970), the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that "[w]hen a witness describes what a person did (not what he
said) that is evidence of what the witness saw and is clearly not hearsay."
Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal
Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954). For a general discussion of Louisiana
hearsay law, see Comment, The Hearsay Rule: The Law of Evidence's Swiss
Cheese, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 279 (1975).
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Statements Impliedly Excluded by the
Rule 801 Definition
Non-Assertive Use
Even though an extrajudicial act or utterance is a
"statement" within Rule 801(a)(1), it still does not fall within
the definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules unless offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 17 For example,
when the issue is not whether the assertion was true but
simply whether it was made, evidence of the statement is not
hearsay."' Non-assertive, therefore non-hearsay, uses of ex-
trajudicial statements include use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeach witnesses,1 9 use of prior statements to
infer that the speaker 20 or hearer 21 possessed a given state of
17. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); Maguire at 748; Rucker, The Twilight Zone of
Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. REV. 453, 454 (1956). But see Morgan: Hearsay Dangers
at 218: "[S]hould we not recognize that the rational basis for the hearsay
classification is not the formula, 'assertions offered for the truth of the
matter asserted,' but rather the presence of substantial risks of insincerity
and faulty narration, memory, and perception?"
18. Whether the statement was made might be an issue in libel or slan-
der actions, or where contract negotiations are disputed. Louisiana courts
recognize that such a use is non-hearsay. E.g., State v. Thomas, 159 La. 1076,
1078, 106 So. 570, 571 (1925); Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected
in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
19. FED. R. EVID. 613 governs use of prior inconsistent statements to
impeach the witness's credibility. FED. R. EVID. 607 provides that even the
party calling a witness may impeach his credibility. Comment, Article VI of
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Witnesses, 36 LA. L. REV. 99, 110 (1975). FED. R.
EVID. 806 provides that "[w]here a hearsay statement ... has been admitted
in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked
may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness." In Louisiana, impeachment
use of prior inconsistent statements is clearly non-hearsay. E.g., State v.
Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971).
20. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, use of an extrajudicial state-
ment to show inferentially that the speaker possessed a given state of mind
is not hearsay, since his statement is admitted not to show that what he
stated was true, but that the one making such a statement probably pos-
sessed a given state of mind. Direct assertions of state of mind, such as "I
intend to kill X," would be hearsay if offered to show that the declarant did in
fact possess that state of mind, while the same declarant's statement, "One
day X will be sorry for what he's done to me," would not be hearsay if offered
to show the declarant's intent to harm X. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
145 U.S. 285 (1892).
21. If the statement is offered to show that one who heard it possessed
certain knowledge or motive, it is not hearsay, since it is not introduced to
show that the matter asserted was true.
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mind, or simply to show what occurred in a given transaction
when the words spoken formed an inextricable part of the
event.2 2 In such instances, the adversary does not offer the
statement testimonially, and opposing counsel may cross-
examine the in-court witness testifying to the statement as to
whether the statement was in fact made.23 When the proper
relevance of an extrajudicial statement is to show the fact
that it was made, Louisiana courts admit it either because it
has "independent relevance" and is therefore non-hearsay, 24
or because it forms part of the res gestae because it was made
close in time to the event in question with sufficient guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, 25 and thus constitutes an exception
to the hearsay rule.
Implied Assertions
Just as assertions not used to establish the truth of the
matter asserted are excluded from the definition of hearsay
in the Federal Rules, 26 neither does it include non-assertive
conduct used assertively. 27 Even though non-hearsay, evi-
22. FED. R. EVID. 801(c), Adv. Comm. Note. The Louisiana position ap-
pears identical. E.g., State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So. 2d 143 (1971)
(victim's testimony that robber said, "Give me your money," was not hearsay
because it was an act that occurred during the incident); Mancuso v.
Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co., 183 So. 461, 462 (La. App. Orl. 1938) (statement
which was "the immediate and almost spontaneous utterance of the principal
actor in the affair to such an extent as to actually constitute a part of the
occurrence itself").
23. Some commentators have argued, however, that where "a person's
state of mind of belief in the truth of his assertion is proved by evidence of
the assertion and sought to be made a basis for an inference to the objective
event or condition which created that state of mind . . . [the] greater effec-
tiveness of cross-examination in guarding against errors of perception would
argue for inclusion of this kind of evidence within the borders of hearsay."
Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 206. Stewart at 24.
24. Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Crim-
inal Cases, 14 LA. L. REv. 611 (1954).
25. LA. R.S. 15:447, 448 (1950). E.g., Shipman v. Tardo, 304 So. 2d 381 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974); Audubon Ins. Co. v. Guidry, 289 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973). Although Louisiana courts use the term broadly, encompassing
non-hearsay, excited utterances, and present sense impressions, its use
should be restricted to instances in which evidence is non-hearsay because
the statement is inextricably linked to the event. Comment, Excited Utter-
ances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in
Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REv. 661, 667 (1969).
26. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
27. The Federal Rule reaches the same result as UNIFORM RULEs OF
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dence may be objectionable under Rule 403, which excludes
otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is "sub-
stantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice or of
misleading a jury.28 For example, Rule 403 may exclude non-
hearsay evidence when the inferential chain becomes ex-
tended, as in implied assertions, in which the inference to be
drawn from an actor's extrajudicial verbal or written com-
munication or from his non-verbal conduct is that he pos-
sessed an inferred belief or state of mind, and from that belief or
state of mind that a past event in question did in fact occur.29
The thrust of the Rule 801 hearsay definition is to guard
against mendacity; 30 implied assertions are not hearsay
definitionally because lack of assertive intent virtually elimi-
nates the danger of deliberate falsification. 31 Presumably the
drafters intended that other dangers involved in implied as-
sertions should be dealt with under Rule 403.32
EVID. 62(1), 63 (1953); Falknor: Hearsay at 594; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 459
(3d ed. 1940).
28. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence."
29. For example, if a surgeon's general competence were at issue, evi-
dence of a well-respected fellow doctor's request that the surgeon perform a
delicate operation on him would constitute an implied assertion that the
fellow doctor thought him competent. Professor Morgan asked, "[Is] this not
essentially a case in which the actor makes an assertion to himself and his
conduct is used as if it were such an assertion?" Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at
214; Morgan: Hearsay & Non-Hearsay at 1142. See Wright v. Tatham, 112
Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1837), affd 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838). Implied assertions
do not fall within the "present state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule
sanctioned in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), because
implied assertions are not used to show the probability that a future event
did in fact occur, but that a past event occurred to create the declarant's
state of mind as reflected in his act or utterance.
30. The drafters believed that "evidence of this character is untested
with respect to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents)
of the actor, but ... these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to
assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds." FED.
R. EID. 801(a), Adv. Comm. Note.
31. Falknor, "Hearsay" Rule as "See-do" Rule at 137; Ladd at 193. Ac-
cord, CAL. EVID. CODE § 225 (1966).
32. Dow, Criminal Hearsay Rules: Constitutional Issues, 53 NEB. L. REV.
425, 427 (1974); Falknor: Hearsay at 594; Finman, Implied Assertions as
Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV.
682, 695 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Finman]; Ladd at 193. See Morgan:
Hearsay & Non-Hearsay at 1143.
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Although lack of assertive intent minimizes the danger of
deliberate insincerity, implied assertions might still mislead
the trier of fact. First, non-assertive conduct may be ambigu-
ous, and may not actually reflect the state of mind of the
actor;3 the state of mind inferred may not have been pro-
duced by the particular past event or condition in question. 34
Second, if an appreciable period of time lapsed between the
event and the act, the non-assertive conduct may have been
based on the actor's incorrect recollection. 35 Third,. the
speaker or actor may have inaccurately perceived the event,
and his state of mind may be a product of that erroneous
perception. 38 When the inferential chain is from the actor's
non-assertive conduct to his state of mind to the past exter-
nal event precipitating his mental state, the dangers other
than mendacity traditionally associated with hearsay evi-
dence are present;37 the trial judge confronted with an objec-
tion based on Rule 403 should determine whether the trier of
fact can properly evaluate the evidence, considering whether
the circumstances indicate that the actor's perception and
memory were reliable, 38 whether the event in question is the
most probable explanation for his state of mind and ensuing
act,39 and whether the trier of fact is a jury of laymen or the
judge himself.40
33. Maguire at 761. The danger of ambiguity should be overcome if the
party through his original offer and corroborative detail builds up "sufficient
strength of inference so that the jurors might reasonably find his proposed
conclusion as to X's motive not only acceptable, but more acceptable than
[his opponent's] opposing conclusion..." as to the actor's motive. Id. at 761.
34. Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 204.
35. Maguire at 764-65; Morgan, Hearsay & Non-Hearsay at 1142.
36. Maguire at 763-64; Morgan: Hearsay & Non-Hearsay at 1142; Stewart
at 37. Finally, the actor may have intended by his conduct to deceive onlook-
ers. Finman at 682, Tribe at 972.
37. Falknor, "Hearsay" Rule as "See-do" Rule at 137; Morgan: Hearsay
Dangers at 214; Tribe at 958.
38. Accurate memory and perception depend upon abilities to perceive
and remember, and their careful exercise. The degree of care exercised might
be a function of the importance of the conduct involved to the perceiver.
Finman at 691. Perhaps the danger of inaccurate perception could be some-
what lessened if the trial judge made a judicial finding that the actor had
"adequate opportunity for personal perception of the matters which the be-
havior tends to establish as having occurred or existed." Maguire at 764.
39. Maguire at 761.
40. Since a jury may be more easily misled than a trained and experi-
enced trial judge, implied assertions likely to mislead a jury may nonetheless
be admissible where the judge is the fact-finder. In Quebec, for example, "the
19751
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The Rule 801 definition of hearsay aims primarily at
minimizing the danger of deliberate falsehood.41 Since the
rationale for the hearsay rule is that cross-examination is the
best method available to expose defects in testimony,4 some
commentators have argued that a definition of hearsay
should encompass evidence with those testimonial defects
cross-examination is effective in uncovering. 43 Although
cross-examination is the best method available to expose de-
liberate falsification," instances in which it is so used suc-
cessfully are relatively rare.45 By contrast, cross-examination
is often successful in uncovering inaccuracies in a witness's
memory and perception of the event and in clarifying the
meaning he ascribes to the language he uses while testify-
ing.46 Since inaccuracy of both perception and memory appar-
ently are present more often than deliberate falsification,
evidence presenting substantial danger of defective percep-
tion, inaccurate memory, and ambiguity should be classified
as hearsay, according to some commentators. 47 However,
such a broad definition of hearsay would exclude much evi-
dence that is reliable. 48 Since evidence may be inadmissible
under Rule 403 even though non-hearsay under Rule 801, 4 9
great majority of civil cases... are heard without a jury by a judge who does
not require the same protection against untrustworthy evidence that an
eighteenth century jury did." Owen, The Hearsay Rule in Quebec Law of
Evidence in Civil Matters, 13 McGILL L.J. 354, 364 (1967).
41. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), Adv. Comm. Note. "Remove the factor of asser-
tion, and risk of insincerity normally vanishes simultaneously." Maguire
at 749.
42. Morgan: Hearsay & Non-Hearsay at 1139; Finman at 684.
43. See Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 192; Stewart at 3; Finman at 707.
44. Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 186. But see Stewart at 22 n.100 (poly-
graph is best method).
45. E. MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE-Foreward 37 (1942); Mor-
gan: Hearsay Dangers at 186.
46. See Maguire at 756; Stewart at 8.
47. See authorities in note 43, supra. If the most logical rationale for the
hearsay rule is that the adversary must be afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant or actor, then the types of evidence included within
the definition of hearsay should be those types which cross-examination may
render less unreliable.
48. Much evidence included within the present hearsay definition is reli-
able. E.g., E. MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE-Foreward 5 (1942).
49. See text beginning at note 27, supra. In addition, the out-of-court
declarant must have had first-hand knowledge of the events about which he
spoke. FED. R. EVID. 602. Louisiana is in accord. E.g., State v. Bray, 292 So. 2d
697 (La. 1974).
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that the Rule 801 definition of hearsay aims primarily at
eliminating evidence presenting a danger of mendacity
should not prevent adoption in Louisiana of the definition of
hearsay found in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Hearsay Which Escapes the Exclusionary Rule
Any definition of hearsay excludes some needed evidence
which is reliable.50 For this reason, almost from the inception
of the hearsay rule, courts began to formulate exceptions to
its exclusionary ban.5 1 Wigmore classified these exceptions
according to the justifications given for excluding certain
hearsay from the application of the exclusionary rule. First,
he noted that extrajudicial statements made by the parties
and those in privity with them, traditionally deemed admis-
sions, 5 2 and prior statements by non-party witnesses escape
the rule excluding hearsay because adequate substitutes for
cross-examination render them less likely to mislead the trier
of fact than most out-of-court statements. 53 Although at one
time commentators justified admitting such evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule because it was inherently
trustworthy,5 4 Wigmore noted that since a party and those in
privity with him could take the stand to explain his prior
statements, and a non-party witness could be cross-examined
both as to his statement on the stand and his prior extrajudi-
cial statement, the adversary system provided sufficient sub-
stitutes for contemporaneous cross-examination to "satisfy"
the reasons underlying the hearsay rule.55
50. Dow, Criminal Hearsay Rules: Constitutional Issues, 53 NEB. L. REV.
425, 427 (1974); E. MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE-Foreward 5 (1942).
51. MCCORMICK § 281; 5 WIGMORE §§' 1430-31.
52. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1048-87 (Chadbourn ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as 4 WIGMORE]. Admissions are "the words or acts of a party-opponent,
or of his predecessor or representative, offered as evidence against him."
MCCORMICK § 262. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 PA. L. REV. 484 (1937).
53. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Admissions
escape the hearsay rule not because they are inherently more trustworthy
than most hearsay, but because of the adversary system. Morgan: Hearsay &
Non-Hearsay at 1149; Tribe at 961-63.
54. McCormick, for example, felt that a party would inform himself more
fully than most, hence his statements were more reliable than most hearsay.
See MCCORMICK § 240. Contra, Falknor: Hearsay at 599-600.
55. 4 WIGMORE § 1048. Wigmore stated that "the party's testimonial
utterances do not pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule when they are
offered for him ...; ... they do pass the gauntlet when they are offered
1975]
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In addition to evidence which escapes the hearsay prohi-
bition because of the adversary system, Wigmore observed
that some evidence, although hearsay, is considered more
reliable than hearsay generally, since the circumstances
under which some assertions are made offer reasonable
guarantees of trustworthiness." Although courts consider
some hearsay so inherently trustworthy that it escapes the
hearsay ban regardless of the availability of the declarant at
t'rial,57 other hearsay evidence, perhaps less reliable, is ad-
missible only if the declarant is unavailable,5 8 so that if it is
not admitted, no statement by the declarant will be available
to the trier of fact.59 In developing exceptions to the hearsay
rule based on trustworthiness, courts often limited their in-
quiry to whether the circumstances indicated a likelihood
that the declarant intentionally falsified his assertion,6°
without considering the other factors bearing on reliability,
such as whether the declarant accurately perceived and re-
membered the event or condition. 61 Courts often deemed lack
of motive or opportunity to deliberately falsify a sufficient
guarantee of trustworthiness to make evidence admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule. 2 Today, in applying
well-established exceptions and in formulating new ones,
against him as opponent, because he himself is in that case the only one to
invoke the hearsay rule and because he does not need to cross-examine
himself." 4 WIGMORE § 1048 at 4. See Stewart at 33.
56. 5 WIGMORE § 1422.
57. For example, statements made by a declarant under excitement re-
garding a startling event which precipitated his nervous excitement, so-called
"excited utterances," are an exception to the hearsay rule even though the
declarant is available at trial. See generally Morgan, A Suggested Classifica-
tion of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922); Com-
ment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969).
58. MCCORMICK § 253. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(4)(c) (1953) al-
lowed many statements by unavailable declarants as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform
Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 68(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 219 (1959).
59. MCCORMICK § 253; Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A
Benthamic View of Rule 68(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 932, 939 (1962); Morgan: Hearsay at 1.
60. Stewart at 1; Tribe at 957.
61. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COL. L. REV. 432, 437-38 (1928); Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evi-
dence Practices: Memory, 50 J. OF CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 249, 252 (1959).
62. H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 14-16 (1931); Morgan: Hearsay Dan-
gers at 186.
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courts often simply reiterate earlier dogma that certain cir-
cumstances induce reliable statements, without investigat-
ing, through means developed by the modern behavioral sci-
ences, the validity of these traditional assumptions and with-
out questioning whether the emphasis traditionally placed on
veracity as the primary factor in determining trustworthi-
ness is borne out by the actual behavior of human beings.63
For example, several behavioral studies suggest that errors
in perception and memory are frequently reflected in the
testimony of a witness who is completely honest and sin-
cere.
4
Even though a hearsay statement escapes the hearsay
exclusionary rule under an exception, it is not automatically
admissible. 65 As noted above, Rule 403 may preclude admissi-
bility even where the hearsay rule does not.6 6 Privileged
statements are inadmissible even though they fall within an
63. H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1931); Brown, An Experience in
Identification Testimony, 25 J. OF CRIM. L. & C. 621, 622 (1934); Redmount,
The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory, 50 J. OF CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 249, 252 (1959).
64. Brown, An Experience in Identification Testimony, 25 J. OF CRIM. L.
& C. 621 (1934); Morgan, A Study in the Psychology of Testimony, 8 J. OF
CRIM. L. & C. 222 (1917). Brown relates an experiment at Dartmouth, in
which a workman entered a classroom, walked between the instructor and
the students to a radiator, murmured something about the heat, and left as
he came. Sixteen days later he returned with five other men similar in dress
and appearance. About 65.6% of the students identified the correct man. One
group was shown only the five new men. Twenty-five percent correctly stated
that the real man was not there, but 62.5% identified one of the five. A group
of students who did not in fact witness the occurrence were treated by the
examiner as though they had been present. Seventy percent stated that they
did not recall the incident, but 29.5% said they recalled the incident and
identified one of the men. Because "trustworthy" connotes veracity, perhaps
use of the word "reliable" would have been preferable in the Federal Rules to
insure that all factors bearing on the accuracy of hearsay statements are
considered in applying and formulating exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE, COMMITTEE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE,
CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE OF QUEBEC (1975), art. 37: "By leave of the
judge, a statement made by a person who does not appear as a witness,
concerning any facts to which such person could legally have testified, may
be proven and offered in evidence, provided: 1. application therefor has been
made in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure after notice to the
opposite party; 2. the circumstances surrounding the statement provide
sound reason to judge it reliable; 3. it is impossible, in all the circumstances
of the case, for such person to appear as a witness."
65. FED. R. EVID. 803, Adv. Comm. Note.
66. See text at note 29, supra.
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exception to the hearsay rule.6 7 Additionally, although the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly incorporate con-
stitutional principles, rights guaranteed an accused by the
Constitution would of course prevail, excluding evidence
otherwise admissible under Article VIII.6s
Prior Inconsistent Statements
Although traditionally considered exceptions to the hear-
say rule,6 9 admissions and some prior statements by non-
party witnesses are not hearsay under Rule 801(d) because
they are specifically exempted from the Rule 801 definition of
hearsay.7 0 Rule 801(d)(1) exempts from the definition of hear-
say a witness's prior inconsistent statements made under
oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,
deposition, or other proceeding.7 1 Since under Rule 801 these
prior statements are not hearsay, they may be used substan-
tively to show the truth of the matter asserted, 72 and are not
limited, as traditionally was the case, to impeachment use.7 3
67. See FED. R. EVID. 803, Adv. Comm. Note.
68. See authorities in note 127, infra.
69. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 130-40 & 156 (1956); Tribe
at 961.
70. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if.
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in
either his individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which
he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D)
a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or
(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if...
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive...
72. Accord, CAL EVID. CODE § 1235 (1965).
73. Courts traditionally limited use of prior inconsistent statements to
impeachment because they felt "[t]he chief merit of cross-examination is not
that at some future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect
adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the
testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to
harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the
witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestion
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Louisiana courts do not recognize prior inconsistent state-
ments by a witness as an exception to the hearsay rule, and
follow the traditional limitation to impeachment use.7 4
The primary justification the Advisory Committee ad-
vanced for admitting some prior inconsistent statements sub-
stantively is that since the witness is on the stand and can be
cross-examined as to his prior inconsistent statement and his
present statement, and since the trier of fact, who must de-
cide which of his statements is more accurate, can observe his
demeanor, the purpose of the hearsay rule, to curtail the use
of uncross-examined testimonial evidence by the trier of fact,
is satisfied.75 In addition, the prior statement was made closer
in time to the actual event than the testimony at trial, and
may have been based upon a more accurate recollection of the
event in question. Lapse of time increases the likelihood that
the testimony will be inaccurate, and may increase the oppor-
tunity for corruption of a witness's testimony by undue
influence.7 6 Finally, the distinction between substantive and
of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather
than truth." State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
The Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules allowed substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements. MODEL CODE OF EvID. § 503(b), UNIFORM
RULES OF EVID. § 63(1) (1953). McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the
American Law Institute, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 661, 672 (1942).
74. In Louisiana, prior inconsistent statements may be used only to
impeach witnesses; they do not escape the prohibition of the hearsay rule.
LA. R.S. 15:493, 497 (1950). E.g., State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300, 306 (La.
1974). The accused is entitled to a limiting instruction to the jury. Id. at 306.
But see State v. McMellon, 295 So. 2d 782 (La. 1974) (prosecution allowed to
recite prior statements as to specific acts of assistance by co-defendant to
impeach defendant's general denial at trial of co-defendant's participation,
even though defendant admitted making prior inconsistent statements).
Louisiana courts have in some instances implied that statements made by
the witness out of court are not hearsay. In State v. Hayes, 306 So. 2d 705, 706
(La. 1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court defined hearsay as "an out-of-court
statement made by a person other than the testifying witness offered to prove
the truth of its content" (emphasis added). But see Lyckburg v. Lyckburg, 140
So. 2d 487, 495 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
75. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), Adv. Comm. Note. See California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 158-61 (1970); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir.
1925); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018; Morgan: Hearsay Dangers at 193;
Stewart at 33; Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: A
Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1079, 1091 (1969); Comment, Sub-
stantive Use of Extrajudicial Statements of Witnesses Under the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 110, 115 (1969).
76. Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory,
50 J. OF CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 249, 261 (1959).
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impeachment uses of prior inconsistent statements is one the
trier of fact may find difficult to follow.77
Under Rule 801, the exemption for prior inconsistent
statements made at a deposition is not limited to depositions
taken in contemplation of the particular suit in question.78
Further, Rule 801(d) does not require that the parties at the
deposition be given prior notice that the witness's statements
may be offered substantively at trial if his statements at that
time are inconsistent with his deposition. 79
Although Rule 801 also exempts from hearsay prior in-
consistent statements made under oath subject to penalty of
perjury at an "other proceeding,"8 0 it gives no explication as
to the type of proceeding contemplated. A preliminary hear-
ing in a criminal case would presumably be an "other pro-
ceeding," ' and Congress clearly intended that a grand jury
qualify, 2 even though no opportunity for cross-examination
is available to the accused when the witness is before a grand
jury.8 3 In Louisiana a witness may testify pursuant to a dis-
trict attorney's subpoena,8 4 and statements made at that
77. Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rule: A Discre-
tionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1079, 1091 (1969).
78. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1); Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VALPARAISO L. REV. 261, 270 (1974). In this
respect, the exemption from the rule excluding hearsay is broader than the
former testimony exception in Rule 804(b)(1).
79. A New Jersey rule allows substantive use of deposition testimony
where the witness is unavailable, but the judge may exclude it at trial "if it
appears that the proponent's intention to offer [it] in evidence was not made
known to the adverse party at such a time as to provide him with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it." N.J.S.CT. EVID. R. 63(3), 64.
80. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
81. Allowing substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement made
under oath at a preliminary hearing would not violate the accused's right to
confrontation. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
82. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974); H. CONF. REP. NO. 1597,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
83. In federal courts, the accused may gain access to the grand jury
transcript or minutes, upon motion to the court, in the court's discretion.
FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(e). In Louisiana, however, the accused cannot gain
access to grand jury minutes, so to allow substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements before the grand jury in Louisiana would benefit only the
state. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 433-34; State v. Terrebonne, 256 La. 385, 236
So. 2d 773 (1970).
84. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 66 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 408
§ 1. Although the statute does not explicitly authorize the district attorney to
take testimony pursuant to such a subpoena under oath, such authority
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time which are inconsistent with the witness's testimony at
trial might be non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1) and thus
available for substantive use against an accused. Even
though substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
under oath is not constitutionally infirm, 85 in criminal cases
policy reasons might forbid their use, even when made under
oath, as substantive evidence against an accused . 6 For
example, the witness's trial testimony may be favorable to
the accused, while his prior inconsistent statement is favor-
able to the state. The accused may be denied a meaningful
right of confrontation and cross-examination as to both
statements, since he cannot effectively cross-examine one'
whose testimony is favorable to him,8 7 and would not wish to
emphasize the prior inconsistent statement by cross-
examining the witness as to it. Additionally, the witness at
trial may deny all knowledge of the prior event. 88 If his prior
statement was favorable to the state and it is introduced as
substantive evidence, the accused will have no meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine him as to the prior statement.
If the trier of fact uses the prior inconsistent statement sub-
stantively in either situation, the accused has no meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at all.8 9
Prior Consistent Statements
Rule 801 provides that a witness's prior consistent state-
ments are not hearsay where offered to rebut "an express or
might be inferred from the fact that the court issues the subpoena, and the
district attorney is an officer of the court.
85. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (upholding CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1235 as constitutional insofar as it allows substantive use of a witness's prior
inconsistent statement made at a prior hearing subject to cross-
examination).
86. The Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970), noted that
while some policy considerations might favor limitation of prior inconsistent
statements to impeachment use, the choice made by the California legisla-
ture to allow their substantive use did not violate the accused's right to
confront the witnesses against him.
87. Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Prob-
lem, 30 LA. L. REV., 651 (1970).
88. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 169 n.18 (1970). Under Federal
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) the witness apparently must testify concerning the sub-
stance of the event at issue or his prior statement is not inconsistent.
89. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 311 (1973); Comment, Hearsay, The Confron-
tation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 657-58 (1970).
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implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." 90 However, Rule 801 does not spell out
the meaning of "express or implied charge" or how an express
or implied charge of recent fabrication is made. Although it
does not explicitly state that the charge of recent fabrication
or improper motive must be made at trial, presumably it
must.9 1 Unlike prior inconsistent statements, prior consistent
statements need not have been made under oath to be non-
hearsay under Rule 801(d). 92 Under existing Louisiana law,
evidence of prior consistent statements may be used only
when it has a non-hearsay use to rehabilitate the witness
after the opposing party introduces his prior inconsistent
statement.9 3
Admissions
Rule 801(d) also exempts from the definition of hearsay,
and thus from its exclusionary rule, admissions by a party-
opponent.9 4 Since the opposing party is in court and can gen-
erally take the stand95 to explain any apparent inconsisten-
cies in his prior statement or action and his posture at trial,
he cannot be heard to object to substantive use of his state-
ments on the basis that he has had inadequate opportunity
for cross-examination, and was not under oath at the time the
statement was made. 96 Use of admissions against a criminal
defendant is of course subject to his fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights.97
90. See text of Rule 801(d) at note 71, supra.
91. The Advisory Committee's Note dealing with substantive use of prior
consistent statements is brief. FED. R. EVID. 801(dX1)(B), Adv. Comm. Note.
The legislative history does not discuss Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
92. Although Congressional debate as to the oath requirement for sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements was extensive, the fact that no
oath was required for substantive use of prior consistent statements received
no attention.
93. LA. R.S. 15:497 (1950); State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973).
94. FED. R. EVID. 801(dX2), text at n.70, supra.
95. A party cannot take the stand and "explain" his statement to the
fact-finder when the statement was one made by his agent regarding an
event within the course and scope of his employment which the principal did
not actually witness, when the statement was one made by a coconspirator
in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy, or when the party's statement was
not based upon firsthand knowledge.
96. 4 WIGMORE § 1048. "He himself is in that case the only one to invoke
the hearsay rule and ... he does not need to cross-examine himself." Id. at 4.
97. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements by accused in
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Although Louisiana,98 in accordance with the traditional
view,9 9 allows an agent's statement as an admission against
his principal only where the principal authorized him to
speak, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) allows substantive use of the agent's
statements concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment if it was made before the relationship
terminated. 10 0 Rule 801(d)(2)(D) is not expressly limited to
statements made by a party's agents or employees to persons
outside the relationship, and is sufficiently broad to allow
inter-office correspondence to be deemed an admission.10 1 Al-
though the Rule draws no distinction between civil and crim-
inal cases, perhaps when the principal has not authorized the
agent to speak, substantive use of vicarious admissions
should be limited to civil cases. The rationale for exempting
admissions from hearsay, which is that the party may take
the stand and explain his prior statement, may not apply,
since the principal may have no knowledge of why his
employee or agent made the statement, and may have no
firsthand knowledge of the event. 10 2
response to post-custodial interrogation inadmissible unless accused is fully
informed of and knowingly waives his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination). Miranda does not apply to pre-custodial interrogation,
United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1975), or to statements
volunteered by the accused, State v. Wells, 306 So. 2d 695 (La. 1975), and does
not prohibit use of statements to impeach the accused at trial, Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971).
98. Louisiana courts generally require that the agent be authorized to
speak in behalf of the principal before his statement is admissible against the
principal as an admission. Haas v. Dezauche, 214 La. 259, 266, 37 So. 2d 441,
445 (1948); Pacholik v. Gray, 187 So. 2d 480, 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). But see
Rooker v. Checker Cab Co., 145 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (employee's
tacit admission admitted against his employer as an admission without dis-
cussion of whether the employee was authorized to speak on his employer's
behalf).
99. E.g., Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1957);
Griffiths v. Big Bear Stores, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 243, 347 P.2d 532 (1959);
Falknor, Hearsay at 591.
100. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(b). The statement may nonetheless be admis-
sible as part of the res gestae, or as a declaration against interest. E.g.,
Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. H.A. Crane & Brother, Inc., 417 F.2d 1263,
1269-71 (3d Cir. 1969); Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 66 (10th Cir. 1958);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1224 (1965); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9)(a) (1953);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(a) (1942).
101. The writer found no Louisiana cases discussing the admissibility of
interoffice correspondence as an admission by the employer.
102. For example, where an employer, P, is indicted for price-fixing,
should his sales manager's out-of-court statement that P had discussed
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Rule 801(d)(2) also exempts from the hearsay exclusion-
ary rule statements which a party has indicated he accepts as
true or adopts as his own, 10 3 and would allow the introduction
of an out-of-court statement if a party were silent when it
was made in his presence, and the nature of the statement
and the circumstances make it reasonable to believe that, had
he not thought it accurate, he would have denied it.1° 4 Al-
though again the federal rule makes no distinction between
civil and criminal cases, and Louisiana courts apply the tacit
admission exception in both civil1 0 5 and criminal cases when
the admission occurs before arrest,10 6 constitutional and pol-
icy reasons should often require exclusion of tacit admissions
by the accused. For example, where the tacit admission oc-
curs while the accused is in custody, his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may preclude admission
of the statement. 10 7 Although pre-custodial tacit admissions
are less constitutionally suspect, 0 they should perhaps be
excluded for policy reasons, because prejudicial effect upon
the accused may be great, even though his silence may be due
methods of restraining competition with a third party be admissible against
P as an admission by him? Although in both criminal and civil cases the
principal may not actually be able to explain his agent's statement, and thus
his need to cross-examine the declarant may not in fact be satisfied, the need
for the evidence and its general reliability are sufficient to outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice to the principal in a civil case more readily than in
a criminal case.
103. See text of Rule 801(dX2)(B) at note 70, supra.
104. Louisiana law is unclear as to whether the statement made in the
party's presence may itself be admitted substantively, or whether the state-
ment is admitted only to give significance to the party's silence. See State v.
McClain, 254 La. 56, 59-60, 222 So. 2d 855, 856-57 (1969). Under Rule 801, the
statement itself is admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the
matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B), Adv. Comm. Note.
105. E.g., Rooker v. Checker Cab. Co., 145 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962); Dunigan v. Haynes, 26 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
106. E.g., State v. McClain, 254 La. 56, 222 So. 2d 855 (1969). Louisiana's
case law traditionally held the silence of the accused under arrest was not
admissible against him. E.g., State v. Hayden, 243 La. 793, 147 So. 2d 392
(1962); Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 115, 116 (1963).
107. Some cases indicate that use of an accused's post-custodial silence
against him violated the fifth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
468 n.37 (1966); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969).'
See also LA. CONST. art. I § 13, requiring that "any person . . . detained in
connection with the investigation or commission of any offense ... be advised
fully of ... his right to remain silent."
108. Miranda does not apply to 'pre-custodial interrogation and admis-
sions. United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1975).
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to fear, ignorance, or other motives rather than his acknowl-
edgement of the truth of the statement.109
Statements by Co-Conspirators
The Rule 801(d) exemption from the definition of hearsay
includes statements made "by a coconspirator of a party dur-
ing the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy,"' 10 in
keeping with the traditional law in Louisiana"1 as well as
that in other American jurisdictions." 2 As written, the Rule
does not explicitly require that a prima facie showing of con-
spiracy be made before the statement is admissible, although
presumably the drafters so intended. 13  Since the co-
conspirator need not be a party or a witness, the party
against whom his statement is introduced may be unable to
explain the actions or statement of his alleged co-conspirator,
so the rationale for exempting admissions from hearsay may
not be satisfied.11 4 Especially in criminal cases," 5 perhaps
109. Even under the present Rule 801, the trial court in a criminal case
should not admit the statement as a tacit admission by the accused unless the
circumstances clearly indicate that the defendant had no motive to remain
silent other than his belief that the matter asserted was true.
110. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
111. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950); State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421, 429 (La.
1974).
112. MCCORMICK § 267. Statements made by alleged co-conspirators after
the object of the conspiracy fails or is achieved are no longer admissible as
admissions. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963). MODEL CODE
OF EVID. rule 508(b) and UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63(9)(b) (1953) deleted the
requirement that the statement be made in furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy.
113. Stewart at 34. Most courts have required a prima facie showing that
the alleged conspiracy did in fact exist. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A
Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1176 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Levie]. However, Rule
801 is silent on the point. Arguably the existence of the'conspiracy is a
"preliminary question concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence" which
must be determined by the court before evidence of the co-conspirator's
statement is allowed. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
114. See text at note 102, supra. Although a co-conspirator's statement is
generally admissible under the theory that each conspirator has made the
others his agent authorized to speak regarding the joint undertaking, sev-
eral commentators have pointed out that the underlying ratidnale is actually
based on the serious need for such evidence, since otherwise existence of the
conspiracy might never be shown. Levie at 1164; Garland & Show, The Co-
Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and
Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1972).
115. In criminal cases, the likelihood of deliberate falsification by the
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statements by co-conspirators should not be exempted from
the definition of hearsay.
The reason for exempting from the hearsay rule admis-
sions and prior statements by witnesses, that the adversary
process furnishes sufficient substitutes for cross-examina-
tion,116 differs from justifications for the hearsay exceptions
based on trustworthiness and necessity. Although the draf-
ters felt that the difference in rationale justified allowing
admissions and some prior statements by witnesses to escape
the hearsay ban as express exemptions from the hearsay
definition of Rule 801(c), 117 the better view appears to be that
admissions and prior statements should be considered excep-
tions to the hearsay rule."18 Clearly, they meet the definition
of hearsay found in Rule 801(c), and allowing them to escape
the hearsay ban by exempting them from the definition of
hearsay adds unnecessary confusion." 9
Summary
Although the definition of hearsay in Federal Rule 801
does not embrace all evidence presenting the dangers inher-
ent in the testimonial use of extrajudicial acts or utterances,
it does provide a concise, workable formula for determining
whether to exclude evidence that has traditionally been
deemed objectionable. Constitutional considerations, though
not expressed in Rule 801, remain paramount in assessing the
admissibility of hearsay evidence, and Rule 403 provides a
basis for objection when evidence that does not fall within the
Rule 801 hearsay definition appears unreliable. To promote
consistency and preserve uniformity, the Rule 801(d) "exemp-
tions" from the hearsay definition should be re-labled and
treated as "exceptions" to the hearsay rule. Because the
out-of-court declarant may be greater than in civil cases, especially where
the declarant was himself engaged in the conspiracy. Levie at 1165.
116. See text at notes 75 and 95, supra.
117. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1), Adv. Comm. Note; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2),
Adv. Comm. Note. See MCCORMICK § 262.
118. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1220-27, 1235 (1965); UNIFORM RuLES OF
EVIDENCE 63(1), (7), (8), (9). See E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF
130-40, 156 (1956); Tribe at 961.
119. The language of Rule 801(d) could be retained in the interest of
uniformity as a separate rule formulating exceptions to the hearsay rule,
thus effectuating desirable uniformity should Louisiana use the Federal
Rules of Evidence as a model for a Louisiana code of evidence.
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hearsay definition found in Federal Rule 801 closely corre-
sponds to that used by Louisiana courts, Federal Rule 801
and the developing jurisprudence construing it may provide a
practical model for the codification of Louisiana evidence law.
Susan R. Kelly
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND THE FEDERAL RULES:
ARTICLE VIII-
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE:
EXPANDING THE LIMITS OF ADMISSIBILITY
In addition to the exemptions from the hearsay definition
provided in Rule 801(d), 120 the Federal Rules of Evidence,
following the traditional scheme,'1 2 also allow numerous ex-
trajudicial assertions to escape the general ban against hear-
say evidence 122 under certain exceptions, when deemed
necessary to the interests of justice and the circumstances
generally assure reliability.'2 Two rules comprise these ex-
ceptions: Rule 803 includes those exceptions that apply
whether or not the declarant is available, and Rule 804 con-
tains those which apply only when the declarant is unavail-
able. Both rules conclude with identical residual exceptions
authorizing admission of hearsay evidence not covered by one
of the explicit exceptions, provided the evidence has "equiva-
lent guarantees of trustworthiness" and meets other gen-
eralized conditions. 124
Rules 803 and 804 revise and expand the traditional hear-
say exceptions, yet, in accordance with the general policy of
the redactors,125 rarely incorporate applicable constitutional
120. For text of Rule 801(d), see notes 70-71, supra.
121. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 254-323 (Cleary ed. 1972);
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1684 (Chadborn rev. 1974).
122. FED. R. EvID. 802: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
123. FED. R. EvID. 803, 804. Space limitations prevent analysis of each of
the 29 exceptions set forth under these two rules; thus only the highlights of
those that most significantly affect existing law, especially in Louisiana, are
discussed in this comment.
124. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(5). For text of these rules, see note 131,
infra.
125. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, Adv. Comm. Note; Discussion of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Annual Judicial Conference,
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